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 Between the years of 1918-1919, the world experienced one of the worst cases of disease 
ever seen. In the waning years of the Great War, countries across the world began to notice the 
onset of a strange disease that appeared to be killing its victims at an alarming rate. At the time 
there was much confusion and panic, and it was not until many years later that the full extent of 
the pandemic came to light. This can be attributed to the fact that the pandemic struck at the end 
of World War I, which overshadowed much of the early stages of the pandemic. By the end of 
World War I, 126,000 American soldiers had been killed in action, despite entering the war only 
during its final months. Great Britain and her Empire lost approximately 908,000 men while 1.3 
million men bled their life’s blood for France. Despite this great loss of life to the war, there was 
more death to come. 
Thanks to historians such as Alfred Crosby, Susan Kent, John Barry and Marian Jones, 
modern historians can better understand what happened. The Pandemic of 1918 infected millions 
of people worldwide and killed just as often. Estimates of worldwide death to the pandemic is 
difficult, as there are many places where good records simply did not exist. Conservative 
estimates place the global death total at between 40-50 million.1 In America, where this essay 
shall primarily focus, the numbers echo the suffering that the rest of the world endured. More 
than one-sixth of the American military fell ill with the influenza, and over 43,000 of those 
infected died. When factoring in the civilian population, the best estimate of Americans killed by 
the pandemic is around 675,000.2 Such a catastrophe like the pandemic caused ripples within the 
United States, forcing the entire country to adapt in order to survive.  
                                                          
1 Alfred Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza Pandemic of 1918, (Cambridge University Press) 
2010, 207 
2 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 206 
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The disease was named the “Spanish influenza”, as the first internationally reported cases 
were from Spain, which remained neutral during World War I and thus had no censorship of its 
media. While the origin of the pandemic is unknown, the first clear reports of the pandemic 
occurring came from an army camp in Kansas. Though it is difficult to place the geographic 
origin of the pandemic, the methods by which it was transmitted are understood.3 In America, 
the disease spread rapidly through cantonments, or temporary camps that housed soldiers during 
World War 1. The disease also spread rapidly by means of the sea lanes that were so vital to the 
Allied Powers during the war. The tight quarters on the ships meant that a single infected soldier 
could make his entire regiment sick by the time the boat reached France or England. Deaths due 
to influenza on board the ships were often noted, but few were reported, for fear of causing panic 
among soldiers or the general public4. As the war drew to a close, many believed that the dying 
was finally over, but the sad fact was that it had only just begun.  
This strain of influenza was especially deadly, as well as unique, as it seemed to target 
not only the old and young but those who were strong and healthy. Traditional strains of the flu 
are normally deadly only to those with weakened immune systems. The fact that all people of all 
age groups were dying of the flu made this strain particularly terrifying. Individuals between the 
years of 20-40 were the primary victims of the pandemic, creating a mortality spike that is not 
commonly associated with the influenza virus. It was only with modern scientific techniques 
that, in 1996, it was discovered that this specific strain of influenza was a precursor to the 
                                                          
3 Jeffery Taubenberger and David Morens. "1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics - Volume 12, Number 1-
January 2006 - Emerging Infectious Disease Journal - CDC." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. November 
21, 2011. DOI: 10.3201/eid1201.050979  
4 Carol R. Byerly, “The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919." Public Health Reports, Apr 01, 
2010. (84-85) 
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H1N1virus.5 This is an especially deadly strain of influenza that kills through secondary 
complications such as toxemia and vasomotor depression. Toxemia is a deadly condition that 
often occurs in pregnant women that can result in the death of both mother and child. Vasomotor 
depression entails the rapid dilating of veins, especially to the brain. When this occurs, a person 
experiences an increase in blood pressure which leads to a myriad of other problems including 
stroke and hypertension. A diagnosis of “Spanish flu” normally resulted in eventual death, 
though there were some who managed to survive. As the disease spread across America, 
something had to be done to assuage the suffering of the citizens. But this crisis was too big for 
one group to handle, and it would take the combined efforts of two strong American 
organizations to stem the tide. 
While there were several smaller groups that rose to the occasion, there were two that 
stood far above the rest in both scope and influence. The two in question are the United States 
Armed Forces and the American Red Cross (ARC). While the operations of these two 
organizations covered the majority of the continental United States, as well as overseas 
operations, I will examine their contributions in major cities. The cities in question are Boston, 
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. By examining their response protocols, implementation of relief 
strategies and their interactions with each other and other support groups, I will illustrate the 
beginnings of national disaster response initiatives. Without the pioneering actions of these 
organizations, it is unlikely that there would be such detailed crisis management plans within the 
national government in the modern day.  
                                                          
5 Jeffery Taubenberger and David Morens. "1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics - Volume 12, Number 1-
January 2006 - Emerging Infectious Disease Journal - CDC." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. November 
21, 2011. DOI: 10.3201/eid1201.050979  
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The purpose of this essay will be two-fold. The first being the explanation and 
description of the structure and methods of response taken by the United States Army and the 
American Red Cross during the pandemic years. The second is to present and carefully analyze 
the interactions between the two organizations. In addition, this work will also examine 
organizational structure, inter-organizational interactions, and preferred methods of handling 
influenza outbreaks.  In doing so, this work will be one of the first to seriously consider the 
notion that the actions, and inactions, of these two groups were fundamental in both pandemic 
relief and as the cornerstone for future relief efforts in the United States and abroad. 
The Armed Forces was one of the first institutions struck by the pandemic, so it is only 
natural that it played a leading role in the attempts to control and rebuff the advances of the 
disease. Similarly, the ARC was instrumental once it became clear that the disease had spread 
beyond the control of any one organization. Since both groups were focused on the same goal, 
they often crossed paths. The pandemic years, despite how brief they were, revealed many of the 
discrepancies that were once hidden within the internal structure of the military as well as the 
ARC. America, like many nations around the world, was wholly surprised by the ferocity of the 
pandemic. The country had to rely on a relatively newly organized ARC for its primary response, 
despite the fact that most trained personnel were overseas. In addition, the ARC was not 
centralized in the way that the military was. There was no incentive for the chapters of the ARC 
to follow orders sent from Washington. Despite this, the two were linked for better or for worse. 
In the early stages of the American war effort, the ARC was combined with the military as an 
auxiliary group as the soldiers would require nurses, such is the nature of war. This meant that 
during the pandemic, the two sides would naturally interact. However, it was not always clear as 
to who should answer to whom. On the one hand, the military has the final say when it comes to 
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the care of its soldiers and installations. This is in addition to directing overseas detachments and 
ensuring that they are supplied and fit for duty. Conversely, the ARC is primarily a volunteer, 
civilian based organization that is also tied to the American government. They take their orders 
from their headquarters in Washington, though their ability or willingness to follow through with 
such orders, which will be discussed later, left something to be desired. This disconnect, coupled 
with conflicting views on how to adequately control the pandemic, led to instances where both 
sides worked together and others where they disagreed.  
When discussing a topic as nuanced as the Influenza Pandemic of 1918, it is important 
first to understand the virus itself. In doing so, it becomes possible to expand one’s 
understanding of the impacts of the virus on society and the world at large. As the disease began 
to spread along the naval routes that connected much of the developed world, so too did the 
world begin to take notice. The pandemic struck the United States in three separate waves, the 
first during March and April of 1918, the second and deadliest from August to September 1918 
and the third wave beginning in February of 19196. It was not until 1996, that by using preserved 
lung tissue from several victims, scientists were able to reconstruct the RNA sequence that made 
up the virus7. In doing so, it became possible to cross-reference the data with symptoms that 
were recorded by witnesses and survivors of the pandemic. Through this method, the pandemic 
could be understood in greater detail, specifically in its biological terms. It was discovered that 
the influenza of 1918-1919 was a form of HINI flu virus and bears strikingly similar base 
pairings with the avian flu IAV. Due to this similarity, some consider the 1918 flu a “founder 
                                                          
6 Susan Kingsley Kent, The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919: a brief history with documents. (Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martin's, 2013.), 121 
7Jeffery Taubenberger et al. "Reconstruction of the 1918 Influenza Virus: Unexpected Rewards from the 
Past." MBio 3, no. 5 (September 11, 2012). doi:10.1128/mbio.00201-12.  
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virus”8, which means that all daughter strains originated from this kind of virus. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the virus has since mutated into varying forms and is still at large, though it no 
longer bears resemblance to its original form. Ever since this discovery, the disease has been 
referred to by some as “the genetic mother of all influenza pandemics”9.  
As for its physical effects on the body, the influenza of 1918 was not the primary cause of 
death. The disease would weaken the body to such an extent that it could no longer fight off 
other infections. Thus, it was often noted that patients died of secondary conditions, particularly 
pneumonia. It was also reported that patients underwent severe mental trauma, including 
depression, anxiety and occasionally, mania. Due to later research the exact mechanism of the 
virus came to light, which showed that the virus killed by turning the body on itself. When the 
body released antibodies to combat the virus, it would mistakenly destroy healthy lung tissue that 
the virus was attacking. In this way, a person’s lungs would become damaged and they would 
effectively drown in their own fluids10.  
It was not only the symptoms that baffled responders to the pandemic, but also the 
extremely high mortality rate that went along with it. Standard seasonal influenza is normally 
only a danger to those with weak immune systems, which traditionally refers to the very old and 
very young. However, the influenza of 1918 failed to play by those rules. In addition to the old 
and the young dying, there was an excessively high amount of individuals between the ages of 
20-40 that perished. Essentially, the virus killed humans that should be in their prime, when the 
immune system is strongest.11 This unexpected aspect to the pandemic terrified many, especially 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 2 
9 Ibid., 2 
10 Kent, The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, 2 
11 Chowell et al. Spatial-temporal Excess Mortality Patterns of the 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic in Spain." BMC 
Infectious Diseases 14, no. 1 (2014). Doi: 10.1186/1471-2334-14-371." (2) 
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those instructed to treat the afflicted. Treating the disease was especially difficult, as the true 
cause was unknown. Standard treatments proved to be ineffective, and the most doctors and 
nurses could do was to try and ease the pain and hope the patient recovered. The historian Susan 
Kent accurately summarizes the reason for the lack of effective treatments by doctors, as the 
approach of doctors during the pandemic focused on treatments that required the disease to be a 
bacillus. The unfortunate reality was that the pandemic was a virus, and the treatments therefore 
had no effect.12 Physicians were often at a loss and would prescribe whatever was at hand, 
sometimes even home remedies in the hope of finding a solution that worked. While the doctors 
and scientist lamented their shortcomings, nurses provided a crucial role in the pandemic 
response.  
The pandemic that occurred during 1918-1919 was on a scale that had never been seen 
before in modern history. It also occurred during a time of terrible warfare, which only 
magnified the crisis beyond its already formidable scope. In face of such conditions, it fell to the 
organizations within America to rise up and combat the disease in any way they could. 
Throughout the many bouts of influenza, different organizations sprang up to combat the 
pandemic. Chief among them were the US Armed Forces and the ARC, as both spearheaded the 
first major efforts to combat the pandemic.  
Perhaps the most influential organization was the United States military, as it was the 
first to experience the trials of the pandemic. The two were closely intertwined, as the first 
records of the pandemic occurred within military installations, specifically cantonments. Within 
the army camps, thousands of men would live in tight quarters as they prepared to embark for the 
                                                          
12 Kent, The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919,  13 
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Western Front. Because American troops were so desperately needed by the Entente powers, the 
camps took in more men than they could normally handle. The crowding of troops within the 
camps, combined with an understaffed medical corps created the perfect atmosphere for the 
spread of disease. Under such conditions, Kent postulates that this environment within the camps 
and in the trenches created the perfect environment for the pandemic to arise: “The condition of 
this war may well have enabled a common and usually mild disease to mutate into a deadly 
strain…Taking advantage of thousands of people congregating together in army camps and 
hospitals…”13 While there is a certain logic to this theory, there is a problem with it. This theory 
does not explain how such a virus could appear almost simultaneously in different places around 
the world. At the same time, the pandemic was already a problem in army camps before the 
soldiers went to France. It might be more accurate to say that the conditions on the Western 
Front accelerated the transmission of the virus between men. If clear lines of transmission could 
one day be confirmed, this theory might gain more credence. Once the virus took hold within a 
camp, it would spread like wildfire, infecting hundreds of men every day. Camp medical staff 
would be quickly overwhelmed by the number of cases, and were shocked to discover that this 
seemingly ordinary flu was cutting through the ranks like machinegun fire. The pandemic 
therefore followed the soldiers overseas and wreaked havoc among the soldiers on both sides of 
the trenches. 
As the death toll mounted both at home and abroad, the Army Medical Department raced 
to find answers. This organization was rigidly structured and focused more for the whole and less 
on the individual, functioning more like public medicine than private14. This is due to the 
                                                          
13 Kent, The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, 5 
14 Carol Byerly, The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919, 84-85 
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widespread focus of the organization. It is meant to deliver healthcare to large numbers of 
individuals, which means that it cannot afford to personalize. If it were to do so, the department 
would risk becoming mired in more bureaucratic problems than it already was. This would lead 
to a decrease in efficiency and would severely hinder its efforts. Despite the large staff in the 
Medical Corps, Army doctors suffered the same problems as their civilian counterparts. The 
large numbers of soldiers falling to influenza and not bullets put a severe dent in both the Allied 
and Central armies, indicating that this was truly a threat to all nations. When the soldiers 
returned home, they brought the disease that took hold of the men within the trenches back to the 
cities on the East Coast, where the disease took root and quickly spread among the civilian 
population. The military quickly responded by ordering quarantines of all army camps as well as 
screening naval ships for sick sailors.15 Medical staff on the Western Front also suggested that 
more room be given for soldiers so that the disease spread slower, but they often found their 
requests denied due to circumstance. The hope for improvement often had to be put aside in the 
reality of warfare on the Western Front: “Surgeon General Gorgas had recommended that Army 
housing provide 60 square feet per man, but did not often prevail. As Gorgas told one training 
camp commander, ‘We know perfectly well that we can control pneumonia absolutely if we 
could avoid crowding the men, but it is not practicable in military life to avoid this crowding.”16 
As Byerly displays, there is a kind of hypocrisy in the words of Surgeon General Gorgas. It 
appears as though he is simply lamenting the fact that his hands are tied in regards to improving 
ground conditions overseas. Gorgas implies that the situation is out of his hands, that the 
sickness is an unfortunate consequence of war. Though the validity of his words are unclear, as 
he is the Surgeon General. His words carry immense weight within the military hierarchy, and 
                                                          
15 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 31 
16 Byerly, The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919, 86 
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though he cannot order something to be done, his recommendations can be very influential. Yet 
he does not continue to press his case, he merely bows before the ‘status quo’ and refuses to push 
any harder for sanitation reform.     
Creating a healthy and medically safe environment is not practical, so says Army High 
Command. In the modern day this sort of excuse would not be accepted, but in this moment it 
was considered to be a perfectly valid reason. This offers a window into the overarching attitude 
of the military towards the war. The conditions on the ground are what they are, and it is beyond 
the ability of Command to change them. Do what must be done and the consequences must come 
as they may. Altering the status quo requires more effort than can be afforded, so why should 
they waste time and resources at an effort that has already been declared impossible? The 
conditions for the individual soldier do not appear to factor significantly when it came to 
calculating the arithmetic of war. Despite this attitude, the Army still recognized when help was 
required. At times, the camps would accept and offer assistance to other organizations, but rarely 
if ever offered assistance to civilian populations. In one case, a cantonment in Ohio rebuffed the 
American Red Cross aid to treat sick soldiers.17 This is an indication that those from a more rigid 
structuring preferred to handle the situation themselves without outside help.  
Continuing with the theme of public health, perhaps the most well-known humanitarian 
organization was the American Red Cross (ARC). The American Red Cross was founded in 
1881 by Clara Barton in the aftermath of the Civil War. Having recently mobilized to assist the 
Allies in World War I the ARC responded en masse to the call for aid during the pandemic years. 
Their actions are well-documented and were often publicized in newspapers and magazines both 
                                                          
17 "Red Cross Rebuff at Big University." Ohio State Journal (Columbus, OH), October 24, 1918. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0110flu.0003.110. 
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then and in the following years. Unlike the US military, which preferred to keep the situation 
within the training camps and other military installations in check, the Red Cross had a presence 
across the country. Thus, they adhered to their original mission, to alleviate human suffering no 
matter where it is found or who suffers as a result of disaster. During its expansion, the Red 
Cross was completely volunteer based, so it engaged in a sort of political propaganda to 
encourage people to step up. They created ads that appeared in major newspapers across the 
country, including the following example from the Dallas Morning News. “Major Townes has 
issued the following appeal: The emergency is great and it is a patriotic duty and a privilege to 
care for our Texas boys sick in various camps. All nurses indicated are badly needed 
immediately.”18 They borrowed the patriotic imagery that was used by the Army to recruit 
soldiers during the war. By doing so, they evoked the same message of crisis and need for 
volunteers that the war had done. It should be noted that before the entrance of America into the 
Great War, no such propaganda created by the ARC existed. Any, if some could be found, based 
their message on the traditional neutral values such as humanitarianism. In addition, the ARC 
pushed nurses through training so they could swell the ranks, as there were far too few nurses to 
aid the afflicted. Through these methods, the Red Cross became successful in recruiting 
volunteers, despite the obvious risks of infection and death. As was recorded within the ARC 
databases, “A total of 223 nurses and five dieticians are known to have died while providing aid 
to flu victims.”19 For an organization that started with such small numbers, as well as the fact 
that ARC personnel rarely faced death, the Pandemic is a singular event. This was a crisis unlike 
                                                          
18 "Women Nurses Needed in Texas Army Camps." Dallas Morning News, October 13, 1918. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7930flu.0003.397.   
19 "Red Cross Response to One of Biggest Disease Outbreaks in History," American Red Cross, January 14, 2013,  
Accessed April 28, 2017. http://www.redcross.org/news/article/Red-Cross-Response-To-One-Of-Biggest-Disease-
Outbreaks-In-History. 
 
12 
 
any other, and it quickly became apparent that they needed help. For the ARC, there was no 
better place to turn than the federal government. It is in this regard that the American Red Cross 
differs from the other aid-giving organizations; no other became as politically intertwined as they 
did.  
This allowed them access to more resources than smaller organizations, yet they were 
occasionally bogged down by their connections, as they had to gain approval from certain 
officials before they could administer treatments and aid. More importantly, the ARC had a 
central bureaucracy based in Washington D.C, creating a physical attachment to the national 
government. As will be described later in greater detail, the political nature of the ARC leaders 
would lead to issues in dealing with the pandemic. In addition, the ARC was not centralized like 
its military counterpart. The organization was broken up into chapters, which normally operated 
as autonomous units. The chapters operated independently of the local governments, meaning 
that they worked with them but rarely needed overt permission beyond standard legal 
procedures. Yet during the pandemic years, it was recognized that this pattern did not continue. 
As an excerpt from a December 1918 article from the Atlanta Constitution shows, the local 
chapter needed official permission, or at least recognition, from the local government before they 
could proceed with their duty. “Dr. C. G. Applewhite, in charge of the federal bureau of health 
here [Atlanta], has given his approval for the movement inaugurated by the Red Cross and being 
carried on by the women of the city to combat the spread of influenza”.20 With the issue of 
having to answer to local authority before providing assistance; coupled with the fact that they 
                                                          
20 "Applewhite Approves Work of the Red Cross in Fighting the "Flu"." Atlanta Constitution, December 21, 1918. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0230flu.0016.320.  
13 
 
did not know how to properly treat the pandemic meant that at times their efforts were often 
hindered.  
The magnitude of the crisis was beyond the imagination of anyone at the time of the 
breakout. This forced both national organizations and ordinary civilians to adopt new methods of 
disease prevention. For the first time, surgical masks were produced on an industrial scale and 
distributed to the population to avoid the spread of contaminants. In many places, wearing masks 
in public was enforced by law. In places such as San Francisco, which was already recovering 
from the devastating 1906 earthquake, state officials found it difficult to enforce these policies as 
the pandemic wore on. In the case of surgical masks, the public was initially receptive and 
compliant. This would change as the pandemic continued to cause misery amongst the citizenry 
and people began to lose faith in their public officials. The enforced wearing of masks was soon 
seen by many as frivolous and ultimately futile.21 Issues such as the one previously mentioned 
would be repeated in various forms across the country as political officials were forced to 
contend with such an unknown as the pandemic. In places such as Pittsburgh and Boston, the 
discrepancies between the orders given to ARC ground forces and the implementation of such 
orders varied intensely.  The Army did not experience deviations from established orders due to 
its inherent rigid structure. Unlike the ARC, the military had an already established tradition of 
obedience towards superiors. Therefore, when an order to reduce troop numbers within a 
cantonment was handed down, those receiving the orders would immediately comply without 
asking questions. This tradition did not exist within the ARC, which would lead to disobedience 
of orders by certain chapters who felt that they understood the situation better than their 
superiors in Washington. Despite this tradition of obedience, since they were one of the first 
                                                          
21 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 110-111 
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groups to experience the full capacity of the pandemic, Army Command was forced to contend 
with the notion that previous methods were insufficient.  
Traditionally, flu was regarded with minimal concern, as the disease itself was not 
normally deadly. When the first cases of influenza began to emerge in places such as Camp 
Devens, a few miles outside of Boston, most officials paid it little mind. Flu, or grippe, was not 
considered a reportable disease, meaning that early records of influenza are either incomplete or 
nonexistent in some cases. Normally, a soldier with the flu would be bedridden for about a week 
and would be back on duty soon after. This was not the case in 1918, as this strain of flu was 
often followed by pneumonia, which was a killer disease. Over the span of three weeks, from 
September 7th to the 23rd, Devens reported over twelve thousand cases of influenza, sixty-six of 
whom died from complications resulting from the disease22. Camp Devens was only among the 
first of many cantonments to be struck by the Spanish influenza. The United States Army was 
wholly unprepared to handle a catastrophe such as the influenza pandemic. By 1918, America 
was fully committed to the war effort, with several divisions already overseas and enrollment in 
the millions. Due to the rapid rise in volunteers and the ever-present request for more men from 
the Allies, the Army had to speed up the training process. This meant two things: one, each 
training camp would need to take on as many men as possible, and the second is that they would 
be training around the clock. While individually, this might appear harmless and at best, an 
effective way to get men ready for war. The issue arises from the fact that they were combined. 
In the case of Fort Devens, the standard carrying capacity of the camp was 35,000. When the 
outbreak of influenza began in September of 1918, Devens housed nearly 45,000 men.23 By 
                                                          
22 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 6 
23 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 4 
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putting so many individuals in enclosed spaces, especially with those that are exhausted from 
constant activity and the lower quality hygiene that comes with a crowded facility, it creates the 
perfect environment for disease to spread. Yet once the danger became clear, the War 
Department acted quickly. In a series of telegrams between Surgeon General Charles Richards 
and the Secretary of War, a plan is quickly put together to deal with the crisis. The eventual 
consensus was to quarantine the camp and prevent the shift of healthy men into Camp Devens.24 
In doing so, they hoped to reduce the damage caused by the disease. The unfortunate nature of 
such correspondence was that it took time. Once the consensus was reached, orders handed down 
and then carried out, signs of the pandemic had already appeared in other camps.  
Between March and April of 1918, over a dozen American military camps experienced 
the disease with varying degrees of severity.25 The standard response for flu outbreaks was 
rudimentary at best, because for the most part, the flu virus did not kill. It especially did not 
bring down soldiers, who were at the peak of physical fitness. Cases of influenza mounted 
quickly across the network of camps along with the number of dead. Time after time, camp 
medical staff found themselves at a total loss as to how to alleviate the suffering. In addition, 
they were almost always outnumbered by the sick and in multiple cases, the staff fell ill as well, 
further hampering efforts to stop the spread of the illness. At first, Army Surgeon General 
Charles Richard recommended increasing medical personnel and reducing crowding on overseas 
troop transports.26 He wrote a lengthy telegram to Army Chief of Staff, imploring to reduce 
overcrowding on ships as well as expertly detailing how and why the pandemic spread. The 
                                                          
24 Chamberlain, COL. Weston P., M.C. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War. Vol. VI. 
Sanitation. (Washington Government Printing Office), 1926, 351-353 
25  Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 19 
26  Byerly, The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919, 90  
16 
 
telegram was sent on October 1, 1918. Four days later on October 5th, the Secretary of War 
responded with the following: “In view or the instructions which have already issued from the 
War Department on the subject of physical examinations and inspections prior to departure from 
camps and prior to embarkation, your recommendation for a reduction in the transport capacity 
to 50 per cent, and that troops be held in quarantine for one week prior to embarkation, is 
disapproved.”27 By this time, the pandemic was a well-known fact amongst military brass, 
though they willfully ignored the advice of the Surgeon General. The initial telegram clearly 
displays that Richard knew what he was talking about, he was by no means making up numbers. 
Yet he was overruled by the War Department, clearly showing who had the higher priority. 
Though in many cases, the best way to control the spread of the disease was to quarantine 
each infected camp and prevent the physical travels of the soldiers to uninfected areas. However 
in most cases, the disease had already spread to the surrounding areas and quarantine was a moot 
point. A good example of this was the transfer of the flu to Chicago, a city so deep in the interior 
that it would be difficult to imagine how a disease that began near the coast would penetrate so 
deep. The Navy was the branch responsible for this outbreak, as sailors stationed in coastal ports 
transferred into the Great Lakes. “…the Great Lakes Training Station thirty-odd miles from 
Chicago. Flu first appeared at this station on September 11, and in a week there were 2,600 in a 
hospital prepared for no more than 1,800. All liberty for men of the Great Lakes Station was 
canceled on September 19, but it was much too late. The pandemic started in Chicago, the 
nation’s biggest rail center, about three days later…”28 This excerpt from Crosby serves two 
purposes in regards to this work as a whole. The first being an excellent example as to how 
                                                          
27Chamberlain, COL. Weston P., M.C. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War. Vol. VI. 
Sanitation, 359 
28 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 57 
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quickly the pandemic spread and the second as a demonstration of the sluggish response. The 
pandemic appeared in Chicago, which was nearly forty miles from the naval yard, only ten days 
after it first appeared.  It took nearly a week for those in command to realize the danger and 
quarantine the camp.  
A similar problem occurred in Detroit, which was a major industrial hub at the time. 
When the pandemic began to show amongst the men in the military camps, Surgeon General 
Richards again telegrammed a request that the camp be quarantined in order to protect the 
workers in the factories. The reply from the War Department simply read, “No action appears 
necessary.”29 Such a delay once again demonstrates the unwillingness of the military command 
to hamper the war effort in any way. While the War Department was quite swift in dealing with a 
problem once it had arisen, as with the case in Camp Devens, they did not heed the foresight of 
others. This attitude prevented the possible prevention of the spread of the pandemic. In doing 
so, it guaranteed that this kind of situation would constantly repeat itself within military 
installations across the country. With such apparent resistance to the possibility of reducing the 
effectiveness of the war machine, this meant it was much harder to make larger adjustments, 
especially the reduction of troop transports overseas. 
As the pattern of infection began to form in the minds of Army coordinators, it became 
apparent that the disease was also following the doughboys over to England and France. Thus, it 
became necessary to slow down the shipments of troops as well as their rate of training.  It was 
their intention to reduce the rate of infection between the continents as well as ensure what 
troops did make it to Europe were healthy and in fighting shape. However, there was controversy 
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over how to do this without severely damaging the Allied war effort. When Acting Army 
Surgeon General Charles Richard approached Army Chief of Staff Peyton March about the issue, 
he recommended a one-week quarantine of every troop ship before launch and to reduce their 
capacity by one-half. March would have none of this, fearing potential weakness in the American 
sector without enough men. March countered with intensive screening by medical personnel 
stating, “It is impossible for medical officers to state with any degree of safety that any particular 
command is free from infection, or that it may safely embark on troopships for overseas 
service.”30 March and Richard eventually reached an agreement over a basic reduction in troop 
transports to Europe, but it was not without drawing the attention of President Wilson. “Troop 
shipments to France were cut by 10 percent and more, the number of soldiers for each seat and 
berth on troop trains was reduced to one, and on October 11 the War Department ordered a 
reduction in the intensity of training at all army camps.”31 Unfortunately these measures were 
too little and too late for thousands of men who had already succumbed to the disease. By the 
end of October 1918, nearly 14,000 servicemen had died without ever seeing battle.32 Only once 
the draft was cancelled at the end of October by Provost Marshall did the camps finally 
experience a dramatic decrease in influenza cases.  
The Armed forces did not experience the pandemic all at once, nor was there a linear 
progression from one side of the country to the other. The disease followed the movement of 
people, along sea lanes, roads and railroads. It started first in the training camps and ports, then 
spread outwards to nearby towns and cities. The pandemic travelled to Europe with the 
doughboys, infecting both Allied and Central soldiers, weakening armies on both sides. Despite 
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the massive increase in the Medical Corps, the US Army was woefully unprepared for the 
magnitude of the pandemic. But they did not battle the disease on their own, for there was one 
other group whose sole purpose is to fight not men, but the suffering of men.  
The American Red Cross is widely considered to be America’s leading humanitarian 
organization, taking part in relief missions both around the world and across the country. While 
the Red Cross as an organization had been present since 1864, no such branch had been 
established in America. This changed when in 1881 Clara Barton founded the American Red 
Cross, an internationally recognized branch of the International Red Cross whose core values 
centered on the idea of “a single independent, nationwide, permanent disaster relief 
organization.”33 It was also important that the ARC would be neutral in all things, offering aid to 
those who require it no matter the circumstances. Simply declaring neutrality is an easy thing to 
do, and it also gives the organization the ability to always claim the moral high ground. 
However, this is not always an easy promise to keep. 
By the time World War I began, the ARC had cemented its position in America by 
contributing aid to victims of a multitude of natural disasters; including the Russian famine in 
1891, the Great San Francisco earthquake in 1906, and the 1913 Dayton Ohio flood. The 
organization functioned as a semi-political organism, receiving direction from a board of 
members that elected their own president. The President of the United States actually had the 
honorary role of head of the ARC board of consultation, until President Roosevelt resigned from 
the position in 1903.34 Despite this, the ARC remained tied into American politics, as this was 
the source of their legitimacy as an organization. When an earthquake ravaged San Francisco, the 
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ARC functioned less as a relief organization and more like a group of bank managers. Moreover, 
they were not the ones who organized the main response. In actuality, the US Army took care of 
most of the ground operations, including tasks like providing shelter and controlling rationing. It 
should also be noted that the ARC negotiated with the army for even partial control over relief 
efforts. In addition, latent political opinions possibly hampered or even prevented sufficient aid 
from reach San Francisco’s Asian populations. While government administration touted the 
ARC’s performance in San Francisco as a way to restore the organization’s image after internal 
power struggles exposed some scandals within the organization. The San Francisco quake was a 
turning point for the ARC as an organization, as its core values seemed to take a shift away from 
tradition. The definition of humanitarian aid appeared to take on a new connotation, trading 
sympathy for efficiency. In addition, the stance of neutrality was instead used to gain footholds 
in business deals and ruthlessly calculate aid for affected areas. “Instead, beginning with the San 
Francisco earthquake, the ARC used its neutral status to negotiate working relationships with 
various business and government interests and thus develop a unified and effective relief 
program.”35 This would help pave the way for a massive increase in ARC growth in both 
numbers and political power. Its growth was just in time for the greatest war that humanity had 
ever seen, as well as the deadly aftershock of disease.  
In 1914, Europe was consumed by the fires of war and the ARC quickly went to work 
preparing a response. They created divisions of nurses and medical personnel to be sent overseas, 
as well as starting a large fundraising campaign for combatants and afflicted civilians on both 
sides. Unfortunately, their rapid response soon faltered and ground to a halt as the war continued 
through 1914 and into 1915. In addition to the isolationist movement removing donors, the Allies 
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began to successfully block ARC shipments to the Central Powers. Everything would change 
once the United States entered the war in 1918. The traditional stance on complete neutrality 
evaporated overnight and was replaced with the sentiments of patriotism to stand alongside the 
traditional humanitarian value. This new patriotic stance was used to successfully increase the 
ranks of the ARC, as well as open new doors in government. Enrollment in the ARC skyrocketed 
during the short time America was at war, and the number of chapters multiplied exponentially. 
“In 1915 the organization had only twenty-two thousand members; just four years later, it had 
enlisted more than 20 million adult members…”36 The neutrality of the ARC was officially 
suspended for the war by the War Council, and it was even attached to the United States military 
as an auxiliary group. Moreover, President Wilson created a Red Cross War Council, run by 
politicians and professional businessmen who turned the ARC into a wartime organization. With 
this rapid growth came the need for reorganization, which is when regional chapters were 
installed. They were to act as satellites for the main office in Washington D.C. as well as serve 
their region in times of strife. However, each of the fourteen chapters would be ultimately 
beholden to the orders that came from the main office. Each would be semi-independent, as there 
was no efficient way to enforce the will of the main office. While this method was 
extraordinarily efficient at recruiting new members at collecting donations, there was a serious 
flaw that would not be fully exposed until a crisis much closer to home came to light. 
As the American war machine kicked into overdrive during the spring and summer of 
1918, the pandemic began to crop up all across the country. Influenza had already become 
virulent in several military encampments across the country. But as previously demonstrated, 
these measures did not stop the spread of flu to civilian populations. The ARC was already hard 
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at work, with nurses already being called to service both at home and abroad. Many of the 
experienced nurses were either sent overseas or requested to assist in the Army cantonments. 
Stateside and urban chapters were therefore seriously understaffed as the scope of the pandemic 
came to be realized. Thousands of nurses were overseas directly aiding the war effort, which 
meant that for the first few months of the pandemic in America, most chapters worked off of 
skeleton crews and half-trained volunteers. One of the first cities to be struck by the pandemic 
was Boston, as it was an important port for the transport of troops to Great Britain, as well as a 
strategic naval installation.  As thousands of dock workers and civilians began turning up with 
signs of influenza, the Boston chapter felt the pressure of the lack of trained staff. Under a 
directive from the Washington office, once new nurses were admitted to the chapter, they would 
be organized and directed by the Public Health Service (PHS). However, the Bostonian nurses 
blatantly ignored the order, stating: “The division office has not provided nurses and supplies at 
the request of the Public Health authorities as the Public Health authorities have not been on the 
job.”37 The Boston chapter also switched from wartime activities to flu prevention and civilian 
relief. They circulated pamphlets that warned people about the influenza and how to prevent its 
spread several months before the PHS issued an official version. By the time the illness had run 
its course, over six thousand Bostonians had succumbed to influenza and pneumonia.38 Though 
despite being one of the first chapters to experience the pandemic, the Boston chapter was seen 
as a model for other chapters to imitate. Their commitment to the alleviation of human suffering 
and dedication to the citizenry proved to be effective in combating the influenza. Though they 
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were criticized for ignoring national directives, the New England divisions were not the only 
ARC groups to ignore orders from Washington.  
The pandemic quickly spread from the coastlines to the interior, infecting major cities 
such as New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Pittsburgh. Though other cities had 
advanced warnings and could prepare in ways coastal cities like Boston and Seattle could not, 
the response was not always uniform. Both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were hit with the 
pandemic around the same time, though the ARC response differed greatly between the two 
cities. Philadelphia was hit hard, the pandemic threw the city into chaos despite the advanced 
warning from ARC branches to the North. Citizens from all walks of life contracted the flu, 
paralyzing emergency services, garbage collectors and even the telephone companies.39 The 
Philadelphia chapter experienced the same hardships as other ARC groups, the lack of trained 
staff and the sheer volume of cases made a centralized response difficult at best. The entire city 
felt the shortage of workers in all walks of life. Police officers, telephone operators, and, most 
importantly, morticians. Without the means to properly prepare bodies and bury them, the dead 
quite literally piled up. Eyewitness accounts all experienced the horror of seeing their dead 
neighbors and fellow citizens, as Crosby summarizes in the following: “They were piled three 
and four deep in the corridors and in almost every room, covered only with dirty and often 
bloodstained sheets. Most were unembalmed and without ice. Some were mortifying and 
emitting a nauseating stench.”40 The ARC could not assist with burials, as they were so 
understaffed that they could not provide trained morticians, so they set their few volunteers to 
other tasks until new morticians could be transported from elsewhere in the country. They 
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donated dozens of vehicles to act as ambulances to transport the sick, as well as setting up 
dozens of soup kitchens across the city. The ARC in Philadelphia distributed thousands of flu 
masks, and provided nursing care to untold numbers of the afflicted. While there was no outright 
cure, they provided the best care that they could. By the time the pandemic burned itself out in 
early November, over twelve thousand civilians had died.41 
On the other side of Pennsylvania, the city of Pittsburgh was also coming to grips with 
the pandemic. While it hit around the same time as Philadelphia, the disease did not peak until 
after the wave in Philadelphia. This gave the ARC in Pittsburgh some much needed information 
as to how bad the situation could get. They worked closely with city officials to prepare for the 
pandemic, and headed missions to provide care for patients both in and around the city. The 
biggest concern that both ARC and city officials had was how to avoid the problems that 
Philadelphia faced, most notably the lack of coffins to bury the dead. To avoid this, the chapter 
leaders advised the city to confine all shipments of caskets to Allegheny County and improved 
railroad systems to increase the shipments of caskets into the city.42 In addition, the ARC took 
charge in the distribution of foodstuffs, medicine and clothing to the afflicted. It was also under 
chapter direction that all hospice supplies would be contained solely to Allegheny Country. 
When it came to the actual distribution of necessary goods, it seemed that the Pittsburgh chapter 
followed its own hierarchy of needs. “Military hospitals and camps were to receive first priority, 
followed by coal plants and war production plants. Civilians' needs came last.”43 This would 
prove crucial in analyzing Pittsburgh’s response, as they were one of the only chapters that put 
military needs over civilians. In short, they prioritized keeping the American war machine 
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functioning instead of ensuring that the civilian population was taken care of. In addition, they 
actively prevented aid in the form of nurses and goods from reaching surrounding areas. To 
many, this appeared to be a very selfish and cold way of deciding who is more deserving of help. 
On the other hand, one might cite that they were following orders from their superiors, as the 
ARC was beholden to the military and in times of war militaristic needs come first. While it is 
unknown if this policy caused more harm than good, it did not serve the ARC’s image of a 
benevolent force. The Pittsburgh chapter faced angry scrutiny from Washington headquarters, 
though others, specifically local political figures, were impressed by their commitment to the war 
effort.  It is important to note that by the time the pandemic had reached its zenith in Pittsburgh, 
the military had already begun their cutback programs to reduce the speed at which men and 
materials were flowing across the Atlantic. In the grand scheme of the American war machine, it 
is difficult to predict if the ARC chapter’s decisions truly made as much of an impact as they 
hoped.  
As previously stated, the military and the ARC were, on paper, two sides of the same 
coin. The ARC was added into the fold of the armed forces to augment and assist its proceedings 
both in the states and overseas. This would prove to be both a benefit and a demerit throughout 
the pandemic years. The once small and loose organization soon became a cog in the American 
war machine, adding their knowledge and experience to aid the fallen. Those who were 
considered trained enough were sent overseas, while those who were not remained at home and 
practiced for the realities of war. “The Red Cross assisted by recruiting trained nurses for the 
Army Nurse Corps and organizing ambulance companies and 50 hospitals of 1,000 beds each out 
of American universities and medical institutions.”44 This worked in their favor as the ARC was 
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granted access to the full industrial might of America, allowing medical supplies and equipment 
to be produced on a scale that had never been seen before. By becoming associated with the 
military, their industry, namely the industry of health, was then seen as essential. The industrious 
nature of America was put to both the production of war materials as well as medicinal remedies. 
Yet for this transition to be successful, something had to be done about the internal nature of the 
ARC. With such a meandering method of communication between the chapters and 
headquarters, creating a unified front against either the war, or the unforeseen pandemic, would 
be nearly impossible. This is why a great change would come upon the ARC in the months 
leading up to the war. 
Before the war began in earnest, the ARC underwent a massive structural reconstruction, 
modeled off of American corporations. The intention was to reorganize how the ARC was able 
to respond to the increasing tensions in Europe in an effective manner and in tandem with other 
aspects of American business. The architect behind this reorganization was Harvey Gibson, who 
was a New York bank manager and a friend of Chairman Wadsworth. These two men foresaw 
the troubles in Europe and decided that the ARC needed to be ready to meet the demand for 
medical care. Whereas before the reorganization, the chapters decided how to allocate resources 
and departments within the organization were loosely defined. But as the prospect of war grew 
near, the possibility of joining with the army effort became more likely. The ARC had to be 
ready, or so Gibson and Wadsworth believe, and if this meant challenging the old order and 
values, then so be it. As a way of illustrating the changes made within the ARC, Jones highlights 
the creation of new departments within the ARC. Such departments had not existed in such a 
centralized manner beforehand, so their presence at this moment in time is especially 
noteworthy: “Gibson and Chairman Wadsworth began by organizing the ARC into twelve 
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divisions – which during the war expanded to fourteen – and then quickly hired managers and 
staff for these units. The national headquarters retained the existing departments of military 
relief, civilian relief, nursing, promotion of chapter activities, and publicity, while adding new 
departments of service, standards, transportation and supply service, and women’s work.”45 This 
was very new to the ARC, something that had not been attempted before. Now the ARC looks, 
on paper at least, very much like a corporation. In this way, central headquarters now has 
jurisdiction over very specific aspects of ARC actions. Before this, such dealings were left to the 
individual chapters. It is another example of the degradation of ARC tradition and the slow 
movement towards centralization. 
More often than not, the protocol was to leave the other group to its own sphere of 
influence. After all, the Army had a war to win and thus put the majority of its energy into 
European affairs. This is made clearer by their slow realization as to the true nature of the 
pandemic and their hesitation to slow down troop transports indicated where their true priorities 
were. When ARC personnel voyaged overseas to the Western Front, the Army was more or less 
in charge. It was a clear hierarchy that was to be followed during wartime. This is further 
reflected in their stateside policy, which was relegated to military instillations. The military held 
absolute authority over the cantonment camps, as well as any internal supply lines that fed the 
American war machine. When it came to urban affairs or the public sphere, they had no official 
policy. Thus, they left those matters to the ARC, which created an interesting dynamic. The two 
organizations already had a history of not seeing eye-to-eye, as primarily demonstrated after the 
1906 San Francisco earthquake. During the relief and reconstruction phases after the earthquake, 
the Army took charge of the situation which meant that the ARC had to play by their rules. 
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While doing so worked out for an overall benefit, it pushed the ARC into a role that they were 
not used to, as subservient to the military. As demonstrated by the interactions between Edward 
Devine, the appointed ARC representative for San Francisco disaster relief, and General Greely, 
the officer in charge of all military operations in the area at the time. “Since the army was 
already doing so much work, Devine had to negotiate a way for the American Red Cross to insert 
itself into the relief process without stepping on military toes. Even though the army had 
assumed control of relief ‘without the strict letter of the law,’ in General Greely’s words, and 
although these duties rightly belonged to the ARC under its federal charter, the army possessed 
prodigious authority and manpower.”46 This shift from true neutrality was difficult for the ARC 
to forget, as the military would not.  
It has already been established as to the ease of disease transmittance within the military 
camps, which similarly resulted in high infection rates amongst the soldiers and other personnel. 
With standard medical personnel being overwhelmed by the number of cases, the Army naturally 
called for reinforcements. Their chosen forces? The American Red Cross, who so generously 
assisted them in times previous. While the ARC was happy to lend a hand where needed, there 
was an unfortunate consequence. Since most trained personnel that the ARC had would be 
distributed amongst military installations, this left very few to look after urban areas. This is a 
further reflection as to the priorities that were set by military officials. While this decision might 
be attributed to the perceived necessity to maintain the American war machine, it would lead to 
severe urban problems once the pandemic spread. While the number of urban problems that 
arose within the pandemic years are too great to fully examine within this essay, one in particular 
will be discussed. The phenomena of parades was constant throughout America’s short interim in 
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World War I, all of them shared a similar goal. Get people to buy war bonds and support the war 
effort. Such financial efforts were deemed paramount for the success of the war effort, which 
indicates that other priorities, such as public health, were shunted to the side. 
Such attitude for maintaining military actions in Europe are reflected in the attitudes in 
reference to war bonds. War bonds were an important cog in the military machine, where 
Americans would buy these bonds as a way of financially supporting the government. While 
there was the appeal of being eventually reimbursed once the war was over, it was seen as one’s 
patriotic duty to buy war bonds. Dozens of parades were held during the course of the war, 
where the sole intention was to sell as many war bonds as was possible. The parades were 
designed to draw out the patriotic spirit within the American public, and they were massively 
successful in doing so. They were deemed so important that many were held in spite of pandemic 
warnings. Nothing could stop the parades, not even the clear threat of a disease which thrives 
upon quick transmission within a crowd. “On September 28, 200,000 gathered to view the kick-
off parade which stretched twenty-three blocks through the streets of the city [Philadelphia]. 
Singing-conductors and speakers were distributed among the marchers, and wherever the parade 
halted, they led the crowd in patriotic songs and harangued them to buy bonds….”47  The result 
of the continuation of the parades led to an explosion of influenza within Philadelphia, with 635 
new cases only a few days later. 48Despite the clear correlation between the parades and 
pandemic explosions, they still continued to occur. Events such as these show more about the 
American priority towards continuation of the war than merely as a blatant vector by which the 
                                                          
47 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic,  72-73 
48 Ibid., 73 
30 
 
influenza was transmitted. Parades continued across the country for the duration of the war, with 
only occasional regard for the prevention of spreading influenza.  
 When considering public actions involving the pandemic, including bond parades and 
occasional resistance to political decrees, it seems as though the public followed health protocols 
because it served their patriotic interests. More often than not, Red Cross propaganda during the 
war years looked very similar to military propaganda. The propaganda took on all kinds of 
forms, with the most common being newspaper ads and illustrated posters. The following 
example was taken from a 1918 poster that attempted to coax the viewer into enlisting: “Nursing 
service is military service, and the trained nurse is as necessary to the successful prosecution of 
the war as the trained soldier. Nurses, you are needed! Enlist for service now!”49 If one might 
recall the newspaper ad from the Dallas Morning News, the slogans appeared on more than 
simple posters or fliers. Such sentiments were circulated nationally for the sole benefit of 
recruiting nurses and coaxing donations from the population. The rhetoric that was used by the 
ARC to recruit nurses echoed the methods used to recruit new soldiers. Both the ARC and the 
military drew on the inherit patriotism that drove the American spirit in an attempt to pull as 
many resources as they could. This is more than simple coincidence, as it reflects the blurring of 
ARC neutrality in terms of political stance. They could not afford to be truly neutral during the 
war, as offering assistance to the enemy would be seen as sedition. Because the ARC became 
associated with the military, though a necessity, would also pressure them into being beholden to 
the whims of the military. This included the appropriation of resources and personnel to affected 
areas, and while the military was not in direct control over how the ARC distributed aid, they did 
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reserve the right to refuse aid where they held jurisdiction. In a bizarre, and albeit isolated case, 
ARC aid to a military installation was actually refused.  
As part of a massive distribution project, the ARC sent impressive amounts of medical 
equipment and supplies to military installations. On the long list of locations was an Army 
hospital at the University of Columbus in Ohio. When ARC supplies and personnel reported to 
the hospital, they were rebuffed by Colonel George L. Converse and told to leave the premises 
immediately. “I want you to understand that this is a military hospital and we get our supplies 
from the government,’ Colonel Converse is reported to have told McCune. ‘You have no 
business nosing around our hospital without a proper permit and we don’t need your supplies.”50  
This might strike a contemporary viewer as extremely odd, as the logic used by the Colonel 
appears to be faulty. At this moment in time the ARC was, for all intents and purposes, a direct 
subsidy of the government and by further extent the military. It would not be a difficult task to 
make the connection and thus invalidate Colonel Converse’s argument. What is important in this 
circumstance is the fact that the argument was made at all. There could be a few reasons as to 
why the Colonel acted in the way that he did. Firstly, the hospital could have been fully stocked 
on supplies and therefore did not require more from a logistical standpoint. While this has some 
logic behind it, there are problems as well. By this point the pandemic was in full swing 
throughout much of the country and the military was especially aware of it. Therefore, the army 
hospital would experience statistically higher percentages of patients and would require more 
supplies than they would typically need during the average season. Ohio as a state would suffer 
21,828 fatalities due to the pandemic during the last four months of 1918.51 Columbus on its own 
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would account for 781 of those deaths during the same period of time.52 While the actual 
conditions within the hospital are not known, the possibility that the hospital did not face the 
same overwhelming conditions that other army hospitals experienced is doubtful.  
 So if the supplies were in fact needed, it could then be possible that Colonel Converse 
was unaware that the ARC was operating in league with the military. If this was the case, then it 
would be well within the right of Converse to deny non-government provisions that were not 
authorized. Yet again, there is a flaw with this reasoning. Due to the centralized nature and 
importance of maintaining connectivity between the military and the federal government, it is 
difficult to imagine a scenario where a camp would not know about the relation between the 
military and the ARC. Maintaining communication is imperative for a military to be successful 
during wartime, even for something as apparently minor as ensuring supplies in an army hospital 
are officially sanctioned. So if communications are maintained and the military officials are 
informed as to the intentions of the ARC, that still does not reveal as to why they were turned 
away.  
 The answer may lie in relation to the issue of communication, though on a less literal 
basis. While the army was certainly informed that the ARC was working as a supportive role, it 
is possible that they were still considered by some to be subservient. In the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the ARC worked either with or under military direction, as their goals were 
often aligned. However, this provided military officials to slowly degrade the traditional ARC 
neutrality in terms of political alignment. Eventually, the ARC no longer acted on their own 
terms, in reference to events such as the San Francisco earthquake, and instead acted on behalf of 
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the military. When referring to a military which depended on a rigid hierarchy for success, it was 
not difficult to place the ARC within the hierarchy. Based on the response of this particular 
military official, that position is rather low. So low, in fact, that the ARC could not be considered 
to be affiliated with the government. According to Colonel Converse, considering the ARC to be 
an auxiliary group may have gone too far as to bringing them into the fold. Even when they are 
needed the most, the ARC is still facing difficulties in receiving the recognition that they deserve 
for their efforts.  
   By the time the pandemic burned itself out in 1920, America found itself battered and 
bruised from two great calamities. Both the First World War and the Influenza pandemic resulted 
in unprecedented loss of life and required a massive nationwide response. When traditional 
methods failed, a new approach was necessary. Both the American Red Cross alongside its 
military counterparts effectively joined together to combat the pandemic. Yet there was a price to 
be paid for their combined success. In order to achieve their mission, the ARC had to effectively 
give up its traditional stance on total neutrality. They became politically intertwined with the 
national government, something which was not intended by Clara Barton, which would lead to 
the eventual centralization of the disparate chapters. While the ARC was able to maintain most 
of what made it such a successful humanitarian organization, it lost a part of itself that would be 
difficult to retrieve. By becoming politicized, they gained the necessary resources to adequately 
fight against the pandemic. Though the question as to whether or not this change was truly 
necessary or not is another matter entirely.  
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